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Summary 
Exit taxes represent an expression of state’s sovereignty by taxing value 
increases of assets, hidden reserves and any untaxed income that arose on its 
territory. These taxes are triggered before the state of emigration loses its 
power of taxation as a result of the transfer to the jurisdiction of another 
state when an individual or company changes residency. The purpose of exit 
taxes is to protect tax bases and to prevent the escaping of untaxed revenue. 
As the EU is established on the principles of a single market, individuals 
and companies are guaranteed by TFEU a number of freedoms that cannot 
be restricted. Due to this fact, Member States cannot levy exit taxes in an 
unrestrained manner. According to the ECJ, exit taxes are split into two 
categories. Exit taxes for individuals have to be only in the form of a final 
tax assessment with an automatic deferral till the realization of the asset 
including consideration for future value decreases. On the other hand, in the 
case of exit taxes for companies, only an option between immediate taxation 
and deferral till realization must be provided. At the same time, Member 
States can request the payment of interest and guarantees until the tax is 
paid. Likewise, the tax can also be paid in yearly installment over a period 
of time without realization.  
The levy of exit taxes can also be affected by bilateral tax treaties which are 
most commonly based on the OECD Model Tax Convention. Tax treaties 
have an important role in the allocation of taxing powers between Member 
States, yet unfortunately in the case of exit taxes a number of uncertainties 
create some difficulties. It is not clear if the OECD Model Convention 
prescribes the taxation of unrealized capital gains and at the same time the 
legal issue of treaty override can interfere in such situations. The OECD 
Commentaries provide contradicting statements in regards to these issues 
therefore the solution to these problems is a matter of interpretation.  
Notwithstanding the aforementioned difficulties, there is nothing that would 
impede the Member States of the EU to levy exit taxes. The ECJ has 
acknowledged that Member States have the right to defend their tax base by 
taxing economic value generated by unrealized capital gains in their 
territory even if the gain concerned has not yet actually been realized. 
Additionally, tax  treaties based on the OECD Model Convention do not 
forbid the levy of exit taxes, the state of emigration has the right to tax due 
to the fact that the tax liability is established when the taxpayer is still a 
resident. Taking into consideration the aforestated, it can be concluded that 
there is nothing wrong with the imposition of exit taxes as it is a fair 
manifestation of the Member States’ tax sovereignty. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The EU is established on the principles of a single market. Article 26 of the 
TFEU states that the internal market shall comprise an area without internal 
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital 
are free to circulate. Albeit the fact that article 49 of the TFEU prohibits 
restrictions on the freedom of establishment and that the ECJ has already 
held that companies are to be treated in the same way as natural persons 
who are nationals of Member States1, restrictions that contradict the concept 
of a single market and the freedom of establishment still exist.  
As Community law at this stage of harmonization does not have any 
compelling regulation in the matter of direct taxation, Member States have 
the power to determine the criteria for taxation of income and wealth.2 This 
means that they can establish what type of taxes to levy, the rate of the tax, 
the tax subject and tax object.3 At the same time, according to the ECJ 
although direct taxation does not as such fall within the purview of the 
Community, the powers retained by the Member States must nevertheless be 
exercised consistently with Community law.4 Taking into consideration the 
aforementioned, it can be concluded that one of the main reasons for the 
presence of restrictions in the EU is the conflict between the tax sovereignty 
of the Member States and the freedoms guaranteed by the TFEU.  
One type of direct taxes that reflects the above mentioned situations are exit 
taxes. An exit tax represents an expression of the fiscal sovereignty of a 
state by taxing unrealized capital gains, hidden reserves and value increases 
of the assets of an individual or a company that leaves its jurisdiction.5 The 
ECJ finds exit taxation as a restriction on the fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed by the TFEU, mainly the freedom of establishment.6 The Court 
determined that exit taxation results in a disadvantageous treatment by 
comparing a taxpayer wishing to transfer his residence to the one who 
maintains his.7 A taxpayer that uses a right guaranteed by the TFEU is 
discouraged to do so by being taxed on income that has not yet been 
                                                 
1 Case (C-212/97) Centros Ltd v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, [1999] ECR I-1459. 
2 Dennis Weber, ´In Search of a (New) Equilibrium Between Tax Sovereignty and the Freedom of 
Movement Within the EC’ INTERTAX, Volume 34, Issue 12 ,  Kluwer Law International (2006), p. 586; 
Case (C-307/97) Saint-Gobain, [1999], ECR I-6161, para. 56; Case (C-336/96) Gilly, [1998] ECR I-2793, 
paras. 24, 30. 
3 Dennis Weber, ´In Search of a (New) Equilibrium Between Tax Sovereignty and the Freedom of 
Movement Within the EC’ INTERTAX, Volume 34, Issue 12 ,  Kluwer Law International (2006), p. 586.  
4 Case (C-279/93) Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v. Roland Schumacker, [1995] ECR I-0225, para. 21; Case (C-
246/89) Commission v. United Kingdom, [1995] ECR I-4585, para. 12. 
5 Daria Zernova, ‘Exit Taxes on Companies in the Context of the EU Internal Market’, INTERTAX,Volume 
39, Issue 10 (2011), Kluwer LAW International BV, The Netherlands, p. 471. 
6 Case (C-9/02) Hughes de Lasteyrie de Saillant, [2004] ECR I-2409, para. 48; Case (C-371/10) National 
Grid Indus BV, [2011] ECR I-0000, para. 41. 
7 Case (C-470/04) N v. Inspecteur, [2006] ECR I-7409, para. 35. 
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realized and therefore creating a cash flow disadvantage.8 All measures that 
prohibit, impede or render less attractive the exercise of the freedom of 
movement must be regarded as restrictions on that freedom.9 
Despite the fact that the ECJ is rather clear that exit taxation represents a 
restriction on the basic freedoms, the Court’s case law also provides 
contradictions in connection to this subject. The ECJ has established that 
exit taxation is justified by the balance allocation of taxing powers between 
Member States.10 It has also held that for the purposes of the allocation of 
powers of taxation, it is not unreasonable for the Member States to find 
inspiration in international practice and, particularly, the model conventions 
drawn up by the OECD.11 Meanwhile, it has also been determined that 
Member States are at liberty, in the framework of bilateral agreements 
concluded in order to prevent double taxation, to determine the connecting 
factors for the purposes of allocating powers of taxation as between 
themselves.12  
If according to the ECJ exit taxation is justified and Member States can 
allocate taxing powers between themselves through bilateral treaties, then 
the question that arises is what is the issue that the Court has with exit 
taxation? An answer to this question can also be found in the case law. The 
ECJ has stated that as far as the exercise of the power of taxation so 
allocated is concerned, the Member States nevertheless may not disregard 
Community rules.13 If direct taxation is not in the competence of EU law 
and taking into consideration the present stage of harmonization, how far 
can the Court go in limiting the Member States’ tax sovereignty in order to 
eliminate restrictions caused by exit taxation through negative integration?  
In spite of the fact that no statistics on business transfers in the European 
Union are available, a 2006 European Commission Communication14 
estimated that one third of European entrepreneurs will be affected by a 
transfer in the following 10 years, influencing up to 690000 enterprises and 
2, 8 million jobs every year. Taking into consideration the well-known 
globalization and the enhancing mobility in the European Union guaranteed 
by the founding treaties, it is easy to draw the conclusion that exit taxation 
influences a considerable number of companies and individuals as exit taxes 
can eminently impact a taxpayer’s decision to migrate.15 Therefore, the 
                                                 
8 Case (C-470/04) N v. Inspecteur, [2006] ECR I-7409, para. 35; Case (C-371/10) National Grid Indus BV, 
[2011] ECR I-0000, para. 37. 
9 Case (C-371/10) National Grid Indus BV, [2011] ECR I-0000, para. 36. 
10 Case (C-470/04) N v. Inspecteur, [2006] ECR I-7409, para. 42. 
11 Case (C-336/96) Gilly, [1998] ECR I-2793, para. 31. 
12 Case (C-307/97) Saint-Gobain, [1999], ECR I-6161, para. 56 
13 Ibid., para. 57. 
14 COM (2006) 117 final, ‘Transfer of Businesses – Continuity through a new beginning’. 
15 Fernando de Man & Tiiu Albin, ‘Contradicting Views of Exit Taxation under OECD MC and TFEU: Are 
Exit Taxes Still Allowed in Europe’, INTERTAX,Volume 39, Issue 12 (2011), Kluwer Law International 
BV, The Netherlands, p. 613. 
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relevance of exit taxation in the EU and the solutions that Member States 
can apply for it are not to be neglected.  
1.2 Aim 
Having in mind the aforestated circumstances, the purpose of this paper is to 
establish the essence of exit taxation and to examine the connected legal 
issues on the EU and international level, such as the interaction of exit taxes 
with the fundamental freedoms, the problem of double taxation or the issue 
of a tax treaty override. In addition, the aim is to assess the solutions 
provided by the ECJ and the OECD Model Tax Convention for the issues in 
question. The hypothesis that this paper attempts to prove, is that there is 
nothing wrong with the imposition of exit taxes as it is a fair manifestation 
of the Member States’ tax sovereignty.  
1.3 Method and material 
The topic and purpose of this paper delineates the materials that have been 
used during the research. As this paper examines the aspects of exit taxation 
in the EU, the main materials used as a source is the ECJ case law. Due to 
the fact that direct taxes do not fall into the competence of EU law, the only 
way that exit taxes can be harmonized to comply with the principles 
enshrined in the TFEU is through the decisions of the ECJ. As a result, the 
main chapter of the paper is dedicated to studying and interpreting the 
relevant case law in a chronological manner. For a better understanding of 
the discovered solutions provided by the ECJ, a number of doctrinal articles 
and studies by different authors have also been used. Considering the fact 
that the levy of exit taxes does not only depend on EU law but also on the 
international agreements through which Member States bind themselves, the 
relevant articles of the OECD Model Convention have also been examined, 
along with the OECD Commentaries which have a crucial role in the 
interpretation of these kind of bilateral tax treaties. 
1.4 Outline 
The first chapter of this paper outlines the background and the purpose on 
which the research is based. The second chapter is one of the core chapters 
in which the essence of exit taxation is explained. It provides the definition 
and types of exit taxes, the reason behind them and all the important factors 
that influence the levy of the tax. The third chapter illustrates the ECJ case 
law, which essentially regulates the way exit taxes are applied in the EU. 
The first subchapter deals with the development and identification of the 
company law legal issues examined in the initial exit taxation cases. 
Although they do not involve exit taxation per se, these cases determined 
the relevant legal issues such as the matter of legal personality on which the 
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ECJ could further develop its judgments. The second and third subchapter 
deals with exit taxation of individuals and companies. The effect of these 
cases on those two categories of taxpayers is quite different. Finally, the last 
chapter of the paper describes the solutions that the OECD Model 
Convention provides for exit taxation, along with the relevant legal issues, 
such as double taxation or treaty override.  
2. Explaining exit taxation  
Generally speaking a taxpayer has to pay a tax whenever he is entitled to an 
income in a certain jurisdiction during a taxable period.16 In the case of an 
exit tax the situation is quite different. An exit tax represents an expression 
of the tax sovereignty of a state by taxing unrealized capital gains, hidden 
reserves and value increases of the assets of an individual or a company that 
leaves its jurisdiction.17 Although it is also a possible situation, the taxable 
base is not established by determining real income that was obtained, but 
most commonly it represents untaxed value increases of an asset belonging 
to a company or an individual.18 
Typically, value increases or capital gains are not taxed until they are 
actually realized (sold).19 In the case of exit taxes, these value increases are 
deemed to be realized when the taxpayer leaves a jurisdiction.20 The tax 
base for an exit tax does not only include value increases but also hidden 
reserves with regards to assets of which the book value is lower than the 
market value because an accelerated depreciation was allowed, or the tax 
authority can decide to claw back previously allowed deductions from 
which it expected to get back taxable income in the future.21 
To sum up, ‘the concept of exit taxation boils down to the principle of 
territoriality’22. Governments wish to protect their tax sovereignty by 
deeming the exit of a taxpayer or an asset as taxable events.23 The objective 
of the tax is to preserve the tax base, therefore at the moment of exit, income 
over which a state loses power of taxation and that was accrued during the 
period the taxpayer was a resident is assessed and taxed.24 For the most part, 
                                                 
16 Fernando de Man & Tiiu Albin, Supra n. 15 at p. 615.  
17 Daria Zernova, Supra n. 5 at p. 471. 
18 Bruno Macorin Carramaschi, ‘Exit Taxes and the OECD Model Convention: Compatibility and Double 
Taxation Issues’,TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL, Volume 49, Number 3, January 21, 2008, p. 284.  
19 Klaus von Brocke & Stefan Müller ‘Exit Taxes: The Commission versus Denmark Case Analysed against 
the Background of the Fundamental Conflict in the EU: Territorial Taxes and an Internal Market without 
Barriers’ EC TAX REVIEW 2013/6, Kluwer LAW International BV, The Netherlands p. 299.  
20 Réka Világi, ‘Exit Taxes on Various Types of Corporate Reorganizations in Light of EU Law’,  
 EUROPEAN TAXATION JULY 2012, IBFD, p. 346. 
21 Daria Zernova, Supra n. 5 at p. 472  
22 Réka Világi, Supra n. 20 at p.346.  
23 Klaus von Brocke & Stefan Müller, Supra n. 19 at p. 299.  
24 Daria Zernova, Supra n. 5 at p. 472. 
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the tax authority calculates this tax as a ‘difference between the market 
value of the asset and its book value’.25  
Although some scholars are of the opinion that in order for a tax to be 
qualified as an exit tax ‘the tax base must represent the value of the 
unrealized capital gains at the moment the person leaves the emigration 
state’26, in the opinion of the author other situations are also possible, hence 
exit taxes can be separated into 4 general categories:  
Immediate exit taxes on unrealized gains – which represent the taxation 
of gains that have not yet been realized but the change of jurisdiction 
however triggers the taxable event.27  
Immediate exit taxes on realized gains – in this situation, the gains have 
been realized prior to the date of the exit, yet the taxation has been deferred 
until a particular time later, the emigration triggers the tax.28  
Deferred exit taxes on realized and unrealized gains – the only difference 
between these two categories and the previous ones is that at the moment of 
exit, an extended tax liability is established and the collection of the tax is 
deferred until the assets are sold or until a different point in time.29  
As mentioned before, an exit tax is triggered when an individual or a 
company changes residency.30 While in the case of individuals, the 
residence is rather simple to determine, in the case of companies it depends 
on the type of connecting factors that a state uses to determine residence, 
either the place of incorporation and registration, (incorporation theory) or 
the effective management of the company (real seat theory).31 
Countries that use the incorporation theory determine the place of residence 
by taking into account the place of registration of the company and if it 
satisfies all the formation requirements.32 On the other hand, countries that 
use the real seat theory require a more significant connection to its territory 
in order to determine residence.33 A company must not only be registered 
there but also have its effective management and central administration 
situated in that jurisdiction.34  
Depending on what type of connecting factor a country uses, it can have 
different consequences upon the migration of a company and therefore on 
                                                 
25 Daria Zernova, Supra n. 5 at p. 472. 
26  Fernando de Man & Tiiu Albin, Supra n. 15 at p. 615. 
27 Katia Cejie, ‘Emigration Taxes – Several Questions, Few Answers: From Lasteyrie to National Grid 
Indus and beyond’, INTERTAX, Volume 40, Issue 6/7, (2012) Kluwer LAW International BV, The 
Netherlands, p. 383.  
28 Ibid.. p 383. 
29 Fernando de Man & Tiiu Albin, Supra n. 15 at p. 616. 
30 Ibid., p. 615. 
31 Daria Zernova, Supra n. 5 at p. 471. 
32 Christiana HJI Panayi, ‘CorporateMobility in the European Union and Exit Taxes’, BULLETIN FOR 
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION OCTOBER 2009, IBFD, p. 459. 
33 Ibid., p. 460.  
34 Ibid., p. 460. 
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the levy of the exit tax. Real seat jurisdictions impose the liquidation of a 
legal entity if it transfers its effective management, such a movement does 
not have any repercussions in incorporation jurisdictions.35 This is why 
incorporation states are considered to have a more favorable internal market 
company law system.36 Companies that migrate from real seat states are 
effectively obliged to liquidate and at that moment exit, taxation is triggered 
on all the untaxed gains.37 The consequence under real seat countries 
according to EU law, is that when a company decides to exit it does not 
have access anymore to the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the TFEU 
because ‘it no longer meets the criteria for existence under the domestic law 
of the Member State, thus it can no longer benefit from the freedom of 
establishment’.38  
The fact that countries using the incorporation theory do not require the 
dissolution of the company at the moment of the exit does not mean that 
they cannot impose exit taxes. According to the ECJ39 Member States can 
still tax all unrealized gains acquired during the company’s existence before 
the transfer based on the principle of fiscal territoriality.  
3. ECJ solutions for exit taxation  
The sequential cases in this chapter elucidate in details the problems a 
taxpayer faces in the EU when he leaves one jurisdiction for another and the 
solutions that the ECJ established. 
3.1 Company law cases  
The first case in which the ECJ dealt with exit taxation was the Daily Mail 
case40. The case concerned a company established in the United Kingdom 
wishing to transfer its central management and control to the Netherlands 
but it was required under the national tax law to obtain a consent from the 
Treasury. The consent was conditioned on the partial sales of the company’s 
shares therefore triggering an exit tax. 
The first legal issue upon which the ECJ pronounced itself was the legal 
personality of the exiting entity. The Court held that unlike natural persons, 
companies are creatures of the law and, in the present state of Community 
law, they exist only by virtue of the varying national legislation which 
                                                 
35 Christiana HJI Panayi, Supra n. 32 at pp. 459 – 460. 
36 Peter J. Wattel, ‘Exit Taxation in the EU/EEA Before and After National Grid Indus’, Tax Notes 
International, v.65, no.5, (2012) Jan. 30, p. 372. 
37 Olga Sendetska, ‘ECJ Case Law on Corporate Exit Taxation: From National Grid Indus to DMC: What 
Is the Current State of Law?’, 23  EC Tax Review, Issues 4 (2014), Kluwer Law International BV, The 
Netherlands, p. 231. 
38 Réka Világi, Supra n. 20 at p. 347.  
39 Case (C-470/04) N v. Inspecteur, [2006] ECR I-7409, para. 46, 
40 Case (C-81/87) The Queen v. H.M. Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail 
and General Trust PLC, [1988] ECR 5483. 
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determines their incorporation and functioning.41 It stated that it is up to the 
national legislation of each member state to determine the connecting factor 
with its territory (registered office, real head office, or the central 
administration of the company).42 Accordingly, the consequences on the 
legal personality of a company upon the removal of the central 
administration (winding-up of the company or retention) depends on the 
national legislation.  
It was concluded that at that stage there was no harmonization at EU level 
concerning the transfer of a business, also no convention in this area has yet 
come into force.43 In consequence, the problems, which are not resolved by 
the rules concerning the right of establishment under the Treaty, must be 
dealt with by future legislation or conventions.44 Therefore, the ECJ 
recognized that it has no solutions for the problems related with the legal 
personality of a company, upon its transfer, and this issue remains within 
the sovereign powers of Member States.   
To sum up, it could be said that the ECJ in this initial case gave Member 
States the freedom to deal with the exit of a company as they see fit. It 
stated that the legislation of some states permits companies to transfer their 
central administration to a foreign country but certain of them, such as the 
United Kingdom, make that right subject to certain restrictions, and the legal 
consequences of a transfer, particularly in regard to taxation, vary from one 
Member State to another.45  
It is difficult to challenge why the ECJ did not pronounce itself in this case 
on the issue of exit taxation. The matter of company law was not at stake 
because the United Kingdom and the Netherlands were both using the 
incorporation system; hence the problem of legal personality of the 
company was not in question.46 It can only be presumed that the Court did 
not want to impose its jurisdiction at that stage, this case only laid down the 
foundation for its future judgments on exit taxation.  
The next noteworthy case with regards to company law legal issues upon 
the exit of a company was Überseering47. Due to the acquisition by German 
nationals of all its shares, a company incorporated in the Netherlands 
(incorporation system), effectively transferred its place of central 
management and control to Germany (real seat system). The company was 
denied legal capacity in a dispute before a German court because under 
German law it was required to reincorporate as a consequence of the 
                                                 
41 Case (C-81/87) The Queen v. H.M. Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail 
and General Trust PLC, [1988] ECR 5483, para. 19. 
42 Ibid., para. 20. 
43 Ibid., paras. 21, 22. 
44 Ibid., para. 23. 
45 Ibid., paras. 20, 21. 
46 Peter J. Wattel, Supra n. 36 at p. 372. 
47 Case (C-208/00) Überseering, [2002] ECR I-9919. 
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transfer of central management. The ECJ found the requirement of 
reincorporation of the same company in Germany to be a negation of 
freedom of establishment.48 
In comparison with Daily Mail, this case added a new perspective in support 
of the transfer of a business and the freedom of establishment. The ECJ 
stated that a Member State cannot subject validly incorporated companies in 
other Member States that transferred their seat to its territory to compliance 
with its domestic company law.49  To put it in other words, even though 
Member States are free to point the connecting factor with their territory, 
they have to recognize the legal personality of an immigrating company if it 
does not cease to exist in the state of incorporation. Another conclusion 
according to Peter J. Wattel is that after this case ‘Member States may resist 
emigration of their own legal forms, but may not restrict immigration of 
other Member States’ legal forms if those other Member States allow a seat 
transfer without loss of legal personality’.50 
The ‘breakthrough’ in company law legal issues was in the Cartesio case51. 
A company established in Hungary (real seat jurisdiction) wished to transfer 
its real seat to Italy. The application was denied on the ground that under 
Hungarian legislation such a transfer would require, first, that the company 
cease to exist and, then, that the company reincorporate itself in compliance 
with the law of the country where it wishes to establish its new seat. 
As in previous cases the Court established that Member States have the 
power to forbid a company governed under their law to retain its legal status 
if it intends to reorganize itself in another Member State.52 If a company 
moves its seat to the territory of another state, thereby breaking the 
connecting factor required under the national law, that state has the power to 
order its liquidation. Following this logic, under real seat systems, the 
dissolution of the company results in the termination of the rights 
guaranteed by the TFEU. Accordingly, an exit tax does not infringe any EU 
law.53  
It can be interpreted, that the groundbreaking part of this judgment was that 
the ECJ introduced a loophole and therefore a solution for companies to use 
when they exit a real seat jurisdiction. The Court introduced the notion of 
‘cross-border conversion’. A company can be converted into a legal form, 
which is governed by the law of the Member State to which it has 
relocated.54 Therefore, to the extent the legislation of the state of 
                                                 
48 Case (C-208/00) Überseering, [2002] ECR I-9919, para. 81. 
49 Ibid., para. 72.  
50 Peter J. Wattel, Supra n. 36 at p. 372. 
51 Case (C-210/06) Cartesio, [2008] ECR I-9641. 
52 Ibid., para. 110. 
53 Olga Sendetska, Supra n. 37 at p. 231; Peter J. Wattel, Supra n. 36, at pp. 372-373. 
54 Marek Szydło, ‘Case C–210/06, CARTESIO Oktató és Szolgáltató bt, Judgment of the Grand Chamber of 
the Court of Justice of 16 December 2008’, Common Market Law Review 46, Issue 2, (2009), Kluwer Law 
International BV, The Netherlands, p. 709. 
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immigration permits so and recognizes the legal personality of the 
immigrating company, the state of departure cannot order its dissolution.55 
The possibility of cross-border conversion introduced in the Cartesio case 
displayed the Court’s aspiration towards the removal of restrictions that 
constrains the right to freedom of establishment of company transfers in the 
EU. 
The solutions for company law legal issues connected with exit taxation 
culminate with the VALE Építési56 case. VALE Costruzione SRL moving its 
seat to Hungary was denied registration by the relevant authorities as legal 
predecessor of the Italian company due to fact that under Hungarian law 
conversion was possible only for domestic companies. The case in question 
elucidated in detail the legal issues of the cross-border conversion 
aforementioned in the Cartesio case.  
The starting point of this judgment was that the obligation to permit cross-
border conversion neither infringes the power to define the connecting 
factor required of a company to be regarded as incorporated under its 
national law of the host state, nor that state’s determination of the rules 
governing the incorporation and functioning of the company resulting from 
a cross-border conversion.57 The ECJ settled that legislation that treats 
companies differently according to whether the conversion is domestic or of 
a cross-border nature amounts to a restriction within the meaning of Articles 
49 TFEU and 54 TFEU. Furthermore, the wording ‘to the extent that it is 
permitted under that law to do so’ from the previous case, does not preclude 
the legislation of the host Member State on company conversions from the 
scope of the provisions of the TFEU on the freedom of establishment.58  
Due to fact that Hungarian legislation provided requirements of drawing up 
lists of assets and liabilities and property inventories before conversion, this 
operation implied to take account of documents issued by the authorities of 
the Member State of origin. The ECJ settled that in the absence of relevant 
EU rules cross-border conversion are governed by the law of both Member 
States in question.59 It further declared that the Hungarian requirements are 
in accordance with the principle of effectiveness and equivalence. Also, 
pursuant to the principle of effectiveness, the Hungarian authorities are 
obliged to take due account, when examining a company’s application for 
registration, of documents obtained from the authorities of the state of 
origin.60  
The VALE Építési case consolidated the right to cross-border conversion of 
companies established in the EU. One important limitation to this right is 
                                                 
55 Peter J. Wattel, Supra n. 36 at p. 373. 
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that companies have access to it only ‘if they seek economic integration in 
the host Member State’61. The ECJ referenced this limitation to the 
judgment in Cadbury Schweppes, in which it stated that the concept of 
establishment implies the pursuit of genuine economic activity.62 
In conclusion, it must be said that company law cases proved to be of high 
relevance to the future case law in exit taxation. The cleared up legal issues 
related to the transfer of a company from one jurisdiction to another laid 
down the foundation for the forthcoming cases in which the ECJ could 
concentrate on the exit tax itself and its consequences on the freedoms 
guaranteed by the founding treaties.  
3.2 Individual Exit Taxation Cases 
De Lasteyrie de Saillant63 was the initial case in which the ECJ addressed in 
detail the legal issues of an exit tax. The case involved a French national 
that transferred his fiscal residence to Belgium, taking along a significant 
shareholding in a French company. He was taxed on the unrealized capital 
gains.  
The Court followed the opinion of Advocate-General Mischo and declared 
the French immediate exit taxation a restriction to the freedom of 
establishment.64 Although a suspension of payment was available, it was 
conditioned upon setting up guarantees sufficient to ensure recovery of the 
tax, along with the designation of a representative established in France. The 
strict conditions were found to be a disadvantage in comparison with 
taxpayers that maintain their residence, as in domestic situations, increases 
in value would be taxed only when they are realized.65 The ECJ also 
disapproved the fact that the suspension is not automatic and concluded that 
the rules under French law are likely to discourage a taxpayer from carrying 
out such a transfer.66  
The French government justified the exit tax by stating the necessity to 
combat tax avoidance. This argument was disregarded, as it was found that 
these rules were not specifically designed to exclude from a tax advantage 
purely artificial arrangements aimed at circumventing French tax law, but 
were aimed generally at any situation in which a taxpayer changes his 
residence.67 
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De Lasteyrie de Saillant is the only case in which a Member State tried to 
justify exit taxation based on the aim of preventing tax avoidance. The ECJ 
did not allow such a justification because the French tax provisions were not 
designed to counteract specifically abusive practices. The Court has already 
held that the concept of establishment within the meaning of the Treaty 
provisions on the freedom of establishment involves the actual pursuit of 
genuine economic activity in the host state for an indefinite period.68 
Therefore, if the French exit tax would have been directed only at purely 
artificial arrangements, the provisions in question would be found 
compatible.  
The question that arises here is whether or not it is in the interest of Member 
States to use exit taxation only as a measure to prevent purely artificial 
arrangements. As stated before the purpose of exit taxation is to protect the 
tax base of a country. Member States wish to capture untaxed valued 
increases, previously allowed deductions and hidden reserves. If Member 
States would only tax purely artificial migrations most of the value increases 
and untaxed gains would escape taxation. In consequence it is clear that exit 
taxation is not about counteracting abusive practices but about raising tax 
revenues and protecting tax bases.  
The subsequent case in individual taxation was N v. Inspecteur69. The 
circumstances in this case were similar to De Lasteyrie de Saillant, as it 
implicated a Dutch resident transferring along with his residence a 
shareholding in three limited liability companies. In this case the Court 
further clarified its views on individual exit taxation.  
In contrast to De Lasteyrie de Saillant, the ECJ also analyzed the obligation 
to submit a tax declaration. Despite the fact that the ECJ agreed with 
Advocate-General Kokott’s Opinion that it is an additional formality that 
can restrict emigration, having regard to the legitimate objective of 
allocating the power of taxation, it was found to be proportional.70 A future 
tax assessment was considered to be not less burdensome for the taxpayer. 
The ECJ also dismissed the obligation to provide collateral and instructed 
Member States to use the Mutual Assistance Directives in order to recover 
claims that result from exit taxation.71  
Another noticeable part of this case was the fact that an exit tax can be 
justified by the balance allocation of taxing powers between Member States 
and by the principle of fiscal territoriality.72 This allegation was of course 
conditioned upon ensuring the proportionality of the measures adopted.73 
Finally, the most distinct part of this judgment was that ECJ suggested that a 
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pertinent exit tax system would have to take full account of reductions in 
value of the assets after the transfer of residence by the taxpayer unless such 
reductions have already been taken into account in the host Member State.74  
After De Lasteyrie de Saillant and N v. Inspecteur, it could be ascertained 
that an exit tax is in compliance with EU law only if it is in the form of a tax 
assessment at the moment of the exit. There must be an automatic deferral 
of tax and it should be due only upon the realization of the assets. 
Furthermore, there can be no requirements to provide guarantees and the 
exit state should take into consideration future reductions in the value of the 
asset.  
The latter can be found to be controversial. An exit tax is connected with a 
temporal component, namely residence within the territory during the period 
in which the taxable profit arises.75 After an exit, the host state should 
provide a step up in value and deduction to any consequent losses or 
reductions; therefore such a requirement should not be the responsibility of 
the state of departure.76 Applying this judgment can result to excessive 
administrative burden. Keeping track of the assets until the realization 
would involve considerable resources both for the taxpayers and for the tax 
authority.77 
The next relevant case for this paper is Commission v. Spain78. The 
importance of this case is reflected by its circumstances, as it exemplifies 
one type of exit taxation that is not very common, exit taxes on realized 
gains. The case concerns an infringement procedure by the Commission 
against the Kingdom of Spain. The national tax provision stipulated the 
obligation for an individual taxpayer to immediately pay taxes on all income 
which has not yet been charged before the transfer of residence by including 
it in the tax base corresponding to the last tax period. The Spanish 
legislation at issue concerned only the taxation of income which has already 
been realized and of which the tax authorities have knowledge. 
The first noteworthy part of this judgment was how the ECJ found the exit 
tax to be a restriction on the fundamental freedoms. The national tax 
provisions at issue implied the taxation of income that has already been 
realized and the person liable for the tax debt is not subject to an additional 
tax at the time of transferring his residence. Despite that fact, the difference 
in treatment in comparison with a person that maintains his residence was 
found to result in the withdrawal of an advantage that exists in the domestic 
situation.79 Taxpayers that retain their residence are not required to pay the 
tax while the ones that transfer their residence in Spanish territory are under 
                                                 
74 Case (C-470/04) N v. Inspecteur, [2006] ECR I-7409, para. 54. 
75 Ibid., para. 46. 
76 Peter J. Wattel, Supra n. 36 at p. 375. 
77 Ibid., pp. 375, 377. 
78 Case (C-269/09) Commission v. Spain, [2012]. 
79 Ibid., para. 59.  
16 
 
such an obligation, therefore for the exiting taxpayer, such treatment created 
a disadvantage in terms of cash flow and it was found to be a restriction to 
the freedom of establishment.80  
The other prominent part of this case was that an exit tax on realized income 
cannot be justified by the balance allocation of taxing powers. The ECJ 
stated that the income is taxed in the state in which it was realized, and the 
income obtained after the transfer of the taxpayer, is in principle going to be 
taxed exclusively in the host State.81 As a result, the Court established that 
there is an absence of conflict between the powers of taxation of the state of 
exit and those of the host state. Likewise, the Kingdom of Spain has failed 
to prove that it would be faced with a problem of double taxation or a 
situation in which the taxpayers concerned would completely escape paying 
tax, which could justify the application of a measure such as that at issue in 
the present case with the aim of pursuing the objective of preserving the 
balanced allocation of the powers of taxation.82 
The Kingdom of Spain also tried to justify the exit tax by the need to ensure 
effective recovery of the tax debt and the need to preserve the coherence of 
the national tax system.83 The first one was rejected due to the fact that the 
Mutual Assistance Directives are sufficient cooperation mechanisms in 
order to recover the tax debt in another Member State. The second, was 
denied on the grounds that there was no direct link in the national legislation 
between, on one hand, the tax advantage represented by the possibility of 
charging income to a number of tax periods and, on the other, the offsetting 
of that advantage by some kind of tax charge.84 
The conclusion from this case is that the ECJ does not accept an immediate 
exit tax even in the case of realized income. The exit tax cannot be justified 
by the balance allocation of taxing powers because there is no risk that 
could jeopardize the right of a Member State to exercise its powers of 
taxation in relation to activities carried on in its territory.  
There are also ambiguities after this judgment, the ECJ only declared the 
national tax provisions as an infringement to the fundamental freedoms but 
it did not state a clear solution for such a tax. Judging from the context of 
the case, the Commission and the Court referred to the decisions provided in 
previous individual cases. It can only be presumed that the previous 
solutions for an exit tax on unrealized gains are to be applied for this case. 
An automatic deferral of the tax liability should be provided until the tax 
can be attributed to the corresponding tax period, future decreases in value 
are not at issue because the exit tax is on realized income.  
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3.3 Corporate Exit Taxation Cases  
The benchmark case in corporate exit taxation is National Grid Indus85. The 
case was about a company established in the Netherlands, which intended to 
transfer its place of effective management to the United Kingdom. As a 
result of the applicable treaty and the Dutch legislation, an exit tax on an 
unrealized exchange currency gain was triggered.  
After the judgment in N v. Inspecteur one could have expected from the ECJ 
to transpose it to corporate exit taxation, reality proved that this was not the 
case. The only similarity between these two cases is the establishment of a 
final tax assessment before the transfer and the accepted justifications for an 
exit tax. The ECJ upheld that it is proportionate for Member States, for the 
purpose of safeguarding the exercise of its powers of taxation to establish 
the amount of tax at the time of the transfer of a company’s place of 
effective management.86 At the same time, the principle of fiscal 
territoriality linked to a temporal component and the balance allocation of 
taxing powers were identified to be valid justifications for an exit tax.87 
The first legal issue in which the Court distances itself from the previous 
case is the decreases in value that occur after the transfer of the company. 
The ECJ held that the state of departure is not obliged to take account of any 
future losses as it could call into question not only the balanced allocation of 
powers of taxation between Member States but also lead to double taxation 
or double deduction of losses.88 Moreover, since the profits of the company 
are, after the transfer, taxed exclusively in the host state, it is the duty of that 
state to take account, at the time when the assets of the undertaking in 
question are realized, of capital gains and losses in relation to those assets.89 
Furthermore, a possible omission by the host state to take account of 
decreases in value does not impose any obligation on the exit state to 
revalue. It was stated that the TFEU offers no guarantee to a company 
covered by Article 54 that the transfer of its place of effective management 
to another Member State will be neutral as regards taxation.90  
The next disparity with previous case law was with regards to the deferment 
of the tax. The Court did not consider that the deferment has to be automatic 
anymore. It must only be provided as an option. Surprisingly though, the 
ECJ decided that interest should be paid in the case of deferral.91 After it 
analyzed the cash flow disadvantage resulting from an immediate taxation 
and the administrative burden of both parties connected with the tracing of 
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the assets in the case of deferment, the ECJ even took account of the risk of 
non-recovery of the tax. Hence, if the applicable national legislation to 
deferred payments of tax debts, has a provision of a bank guarantee, that 
measure is acceptable.92  
Perhaps the most important part of this judgment was the fact that the ECJ 
settled in an unquestionable manner the right of Member States to levy an 
exit tax. The Court held that the transfer of the place of effective 
management of a company of one state to another cannot mean that the state 
of origin has to abandon its right to tax a capital gain which arose within the 
ambit of its powers of taxation before the transfer.93 A Member State is 
entitled to charge tax on those gains at the time when the taxpayer leaves the 
country and such a measure is intended to prevent situations capable of 
jeopardizing the right of the Member State of origin to exercise its powers 
of taxation in relation to activities carried on in its territory.94 
Last but not least, it is important to mention that the ECJ also examined the 
issue of legal personality of the exiting company. The Court restated that 
Member States have the power to define the connecting factor required of a 
company if it is to be regarded as incorporated under its national law and as 
such capable of enjoying the right of establishment. Contrary to the Daily 
Mail case, it held that the issue of legal personality of the company was not 
in question because both countries are using incorporation system, therefore 
the transfer did not affect that company’s possibility of relying on Article 49 
TFEU.95 
It could be concluded that ‘National Grid Indus reversed the Daily Mail case 
and amended the N v. Inspecteur’.96 A company exiting an incorporation 
system has the option between immediate taxation and the deferral of the 
exit tax.97 If the deferral option is chosen, the state of departure is entitled to 
receive interest and may require a bank guarantee from the exiting company 
due to the risk of non-recovery. However, in the author’s opinion this does 
not mean that the former cases in individual exit taxation are obsolete. 
Those cases still apply to individuals as the ECJ has made a clear difference 
in this judgment between an individual and a company’s assets and its 
taxable profits.98 Therefore the solutions provided in individual exit taxation 
cases are still relevant.  
The sequential infringement procedures of the European Commission 
against Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands and Denmark concerning their 
national exit taxation systems have shed some new light in corporate exit 
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taxation and also reaffirmed some of its previous decisions. The ECJ 
confirmed that immediate taxation of unrealized capital gains on the transfer 
of the place of residence or of the assets of a company to another Member 
State represents an infringement of Article 49 TFEU.99 It therefore 
maintained its former views that deferment represents a less harmful 
measure and should be provided as an alternative.100 Another reaffirmed 
issue was the fact that a final assessment of the tax due is proportional to the 
objective of safeguarding the exercise of its tax jurisdiction.101 In 
Commission v. Portugal the ECJ also confirmed the lawfulness of requiring 
interest upon deferral. However, this was not mentioned in the other 
infringement procedures. 
In Commission v. Denmark, a case concerning exit taxation on the transfer 
of assets of a company to another Member State, we can witness a shift in 
the Court’s view with regards to the moment of taxation. The 
representatives of Denmark and other Member States convinced the ECJ 
that in the case of depreciable non-financial assets, the exiting state can tax 
unrealized gains at different point of time than the actual realization. The 
value of these kind of assets is limited in time, therefore if companies could 
defer taxation of assets until their disposal, they could avoid paying the 
tax.102 In these circumstances, the Court decided that Member States are 
entitled to tax capital gains at another event than the actual disposal in order 
to ensure taxation.103 
The new legal issue tackled in Commission v. Denmark concerning the 
collection of the exit tax was further developed by the ECJ in the DMC104 
case. The conversion of an interest in a limited partnership into shares of a 
capital company had the effect of removal of the income from the exercise 
of the taxing powers of Germany, consequently triggering an exit tax. The 
provisions of the German law enabled a taxable person to spread the exit tax 
over a period of five years, without being required to pay interest.105  
The Court approved the German deferral system, motivating its decision to 
the fact that the risk of non-recovery of the tax in such circumstances 
increases with the passing of time. Thus, in contrast to the previous case, the 
ECJ did not only confirm the right of Member States to collect the tax at a 
different point in time than the actual realization, but also approved an 
existing mechanism for it. Another innovative part of this judgment was the 
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fact that the provision of guarantees was conditioned upon prior assessment 
of a risk of non-recovery.106 It can be assumed that without a considerable 
risk of non-recovery the requirement of bank guarantees would be a 
disproportionate measure. 
The same result can be expected from the new pending case Verder LabTec 
v. Finanzamt Hilden107, which also concerns the German tax rules that 
establishes tax liability to be paid in yearly instalments over a period of 10 
years in the case of an exit tax on hidden reserves. The Advocate-General 
Jääskinen made a retrospective of all the noteworthy exit tax cases and came 
to the conclusion that since Commission v. Denmark and DMC the ECJ does 
not impose an obligation on Member States to allow payment of the exit tax 
to be deferred until actual realization of the assets, as it is not the only 
permissible chargeable event.108 Ergo, an alternative method of recovery of 
the tax is also possible, supplying the tax subject with a choice between 
immediate payment and recovery of the tax in installments is 
proportionate.109 
The last case worthy of being mentioned for this paper is Nordea Bank110. A 
restructuring process resulted in the partial sale of some foreign PEs over 
which the Kingdom of Denmark exercised its powers of taxation. As a 
consequence the previously deducted losses of those foreign PEs were 
reincorporated into Nordea Bank’s taxable profit.  
Once again the ECJ found a disadvantageous treatment in comparison to the 
domestic situation in which the transfer does not entail the reincorporation 
of deducted losses, a restriction to the freedom of establishment.111 The ECJ 
recalled that the balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes has the 
objective to safeguard the symmetry between the right to tax profits and the 
right to deduct losses.112  As a consequence, the right to deduct losses cannot 
be denied if Member States tax the profits made in respect of that 
establishment before its transfer, including those resulting from the gain 
made upon the transfer.113  
To put it differently, the ECJ decided that not all type of exit taxes can be 
justified by the balance allocation of taxing powers and that essentially 
Member States cannot tax absolutely everything when a company leaves its 
jurisdiction. As long as Member States have the power to tax the profits and 
other gains, the right to deduct losses can be compared to the right to deduct 
costs and expenses used to obtain those profits, it cannot be denied.  
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Consequently, in its latest judgments on exit taxation, while the ECJ helped 
clarify the characteristics of an acceptable exit tax system for companies it 
also tried to limit as much as possible the restrictions on the basic freedoms 
that these taxes imply by consenting another alternative taxation system and 
limiting the applicability of guarantees.  
4. Bilateral treaties solution - OECD Model Tax Convention 
According to the ECJ case law for the purposes of the allocation of powers 
of taxation, Member States are free to find inspiration in international 
practice and, particularly, the model conventions drawn up by the OECD.114 
Hence, the relevant articles of the OECD Model Convention need to be 
examined in order to determine if they provide any solutions for exit 
taxation. Before proceeding to that, a number of issues that arise in the 
applicability of the Model Convention in the case of exit taxes must be 
clarified and some general remarks should be made for their better 
comprehension. 
The main purpose of the OECD Model Convention is to prevent double 
taxation.115 This objective is realized through the allocation of taxing 
powers between the Contracting States.116 It is imperative to understand that 
the way the Model Convention works is not by giving or enhancing taxing 
rights, but on the contrary, countries come to an agreement to actually 
restrict their right in taxing certain types of income.117 
As a result of the aforementioned, Contracting States allocate their taxing 
powers by bilateral treaties through 3 approaches: 
1. Taxing income and capital without limitation at source, such as 
employment income, profits of a PE or income from immovable property.118  
2. Taxing income and capital with limitation (sharing taxation) at 
source such as dividends and interest.119   
3. Taxing income and capital based on the state of residence of the 
taxpayer such as royalties, gains from the alienation of shares or 
securities.120  
Article 1 of the OECD Model Convention states that it shall apply to 
persons who are residents of one or both of the Contracting States. In 
consequence, the effect of the provisions of the Convention on a 
Contracting State’s right to tax income arising on its territory depends on 
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the taxable person’s residency. On the other hand, the principle of 
territoriality on which an exit tax is based envisages that the tax is levied by 
virtue of the fact that the taxable income arose on its territory.121 The change 
of residency in most cases according to the Model Convention can restrict a 
state’s right to tax, while in the case of exit taxes the change of residency is 
what actually triggers the taxable event. Therefore, there is a conflict 
between the general principles based on which the OECD Model 
Convention and exit taxes work. 
As exit taxes commonly represent taxes on value increases of an asset 
belonging to a company or an individual, the appropriate article that would 
apply to such taxes is article 13 – capital gains.122 According to the 
Commentary on the OECD Model Convention, this article does not specify 
to what kind of tax it applies, it is understood that the article must apply to 
all kinds of taxes levied by a Contracting State on capital gains, it is left to 
the domestic law of each Contracting State to decide whether capital gains 
should be taxed and, if they are taxable, how they are to be taxed.123  
However, as exit taxes are usually levied in the case of unrealized capital 
gains, it is not clear if the Convention applies to these kind of taxes. 
4.1  The concept of alienation  
Article 13(5) which is suitable for exit taxes on capital appreciation states 
that ‘gains from the alienation of any property, other than that referred to in 
paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4, shall be taxable only in the Contracting State of 
which the alienator is a resident’. The words ‘alienation of any property’ 
would seemingly indicate that it refers only to realized capital gains. 
Meanwhile, the taxable event for exit taxes generally represents a deemed 
disposal of an asset that occurs at the moment of emigration, therefore a 
fiction and not a real alienation.124 This would mean that this article is not 
applicable, or if it were to be applied in the case of exit taxes it might raise 
the question of treaty override. As there are considerable debates concerning 
the concept of ‘alienation’, this issue must also be analyzed.125  
The Commentary on article 13 of the Model Convention provides 
contradicting statements with regards to this aspect. On one hand, it 
formulates a definition for ‘alienation’ that indicates that there must be a 
sale or exchange of property and therefore a transfer of ownership.126 On the 
other hand, it states that taxes on capital gains vary from one country to 
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another, in most cases appreciation in value not associated with the 
alienation of a capital asset is not taxed, however, it specifies a number of 
situations when the taxation of the capital appreciation without alienation is 
possible.127 
The first described situation is the taxation of capital appreciation in the 
case of reevaluation of business assets. It is depicted, that a number of states 
levy special taxes on book profits; such revaluations may result from the 
fact that the value of the asset has increased in a manner that the owner 
proceeds to the revaluation of this asset in his book.128 This may happen due 
to a number of reasons, like depreciation of national currency, an increase in 
the paid-up capital or amounts put into reserve.129 The fact is that the 
Commentary points out explicitly that such taxes on capital appreciation are 
levied even if there is no alienation, and they are covered by Article 2 of the 
Convention.130  
The second situation outlines the taxation of capital appreciation in the case 
of transfer of an asset from a PE situated in the territory of a state to a PE or 
the head office of the same enterprise situated in another state.131 The 
Commentary states that these kind of transfers are treated as alienations and 
that the article does not prevent these states from taxing profits or gains 
deemed to arise in connection with such a transfer.132  
Taking into consideration the described situations, it is in the opinion of the 
author that article 13(5) can be applied in the case of exit taxes where most 
commonly they are levied in circumstances in which there is no real 
alienation. The second example (transfer of an asset from a PE to another 
state) provided by the Commentary is particularly convincing. The taxation 
of value increases of an asset, over which a state loses its power of taxation 
as a result of transfer to the jurisdiction of another state fits perfectly into 
the definition of exit taxation.  
This line of reasoning was also supported in the exit taxation cases133 on 
substantial shareholding at the Netherlands Supreme Court. The 
Netherlands’ Income Tax Act construes the term alienation with the time a 
taxpayer changes residency and deems the moment of realization at the time 
before the taxpayer loses residency.134 The Supreme Court ruled upon the 
compliance of the Netherlands exit tax on the increase in the value of the 
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shares upon the emigration of the shareholders with the provisions on 
capital gains in the tax treaties between the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom, Belgium and the United States.135 
The Supreme Court settled upon the term ‘alienation’ and concluded that it 
has a broad meaning which also includes deemed realization.136 The Court 
referred its decision to the OECD Commentary on article 13, especially to 
paragraph 8 in which it is stated that special circumstances may lead to the 
taxation of the capital appreciation of an asset that has not been alienated.137 
The Court also reiterated the special situation described above, concerning 
the taxation of capital appreciation in the case of asset reevaluation. Hence, 
it was concluded that the Netherlands has the right to tax accrued and not 
yet realized capital gains under article 13(4) (corresponding to article 13(5) 
of the OECD Model), and that the notion of alienation also included the 
notion of deemed alienation.138 
Another case that supports the same reasoning concerning the term 
‘alienation’ is the South African exit taxation case C:SARS v. Tradehold 
Limited139. The South African tax provision also deems the disposal of 
assets upon the change of residency. Due to the fact that Tradehold Limited 
changed its effective management to Luxembourg an exit tax on its 
shareholding in another company followed.  
In this case, the tax authority contested Tradehold Limited’s right to rely on 
the protection of treaty between South Africa and Luxembourg for the 
reason that they considered that the term ‘alienation’ from article 13(4) 
(corresponding to article 13(5) of the OECD Model Convention) did not 
include a deemed disposal of property. As a consequence, the Supreme 
Court of South Africa analyzed the meaning of this term.  
The Court reached the conclusion that article 13 is widely cast and it 
includes within its ambit capital gains derived from the alienation of all 
property.140 It was stated that that the term ‘alienation’ as it is used in the 
treaty is not restricted to actual alienation.141 It is a neutral term having a 
broader meaning, comprehending both actual and deemed disposals of 
assets giving rise to taxable capital gains. Therefore, article 13(4) of the 
treaty applies to capital gains that arise from both actual and deemed 
alienations or disposals of property.142 
The aforementioned cases demonstrate that both on the EU and international 
level it is not uncommon that the term ‘alienation’ from article 13(5) of the 
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OECD Model Convention to be interpreted to include the deemed disposal 
of unrealized gains. As a consequence, the article in question is appropriate 
to deal with exit taxation.  
4.2   Treaty override 
Regarding the legal issue of treaty override, the identification of such a 
breach in international law, is matter of interpretation, which depends on the 
wording of the treaties and the national legislation of the Contracting 
States.143 The term ‘treaty override’ according to the OECD Report means 
‘a situation where the domestic legislation of a State overrules provisions of 
either a single treaty or all treaties hitherto having had effect in that 
State’.144 The problem of this definition is that the structure and the 
functioning of the OECD Model Convention is very dependent on the 
domestic legislation of the Contracting States.145 As it was mentioned 
before, Contracting States come to an agreement to actually restrict their 
right in taxing certain types of income by the means of international norms 
enshrined in the OECD Convention.146 Therefore when analyzing the matter 
of a treaty override it is necessary to analyze if the national legislation based 
on which a tax is levied has been restricted or limited by the Convention.147  
The term ‘alienation’ is not defined in the OECD Model Convention, 
therefore for such situations article 3(2) plays a crucial role.148 It states that 
‘…any term not defined therein shall, unless the context otherwise requires, 
have the meaning that it has at that time under the law of that State for the 
purposes of the taxes to which the Convention applies…’. This article grants 
the right to a state to use the definition from domestic law on any term 
which is not defined in the Convention with one limitation, it must be in the 
context and the purpose of the treaty at the moment of application.149 The 
question that arises in these conditions is if the deeming of an alienation of 
assets without realization at the moment of emigration is against the context 
and purpose of the Convention? 
In the opinion of the author, judging from the context of the OECD 
Commentary on article 13, a deemed realization cannot be interpreted as a 
treaty override. The Commentary as described above anticipates situations 
in which Contracting States can tax capital appreciations without any actual 
alienation. Moreover, some countries are already using these situations as 
justifications in Courts for defending their right in levying exit taxes. Given 
these facts, it can be concluded that there are sufficient arguments for 
                                                 
143 Carla De Pietro, Supra n. 134 at pp. 3, 4.  
144 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs Report on Tax Treaty Overrides, 1989. 
145 Carla De Pietro, Supra n. 134 at p. 3. 
146 Fernando de Man & Tiiu Albin, Supra n. 15 at p. 617 
147 Carla De Pietro, Supra n. 134 at pp. 3, 4. 
148 Ibid., p. 4. 
149 Ibid., p. 6. 
26 
 
Contracting States to consider their national legislation on deeming 
alienation as in the context and purpose of the OECD Model Convention. 
4.3   The right to tax 
As it was established that article 13(5) is appropriate to use in the case of 
exit taxes, the next step is to determine what allocating solutions can be 
applied. Due to the fact that this paper examines the issues related to exit 
taxation at the EU level, the solutions that the OECD Model Convention can 
provide must be analyzed from this perspective. 
According to the ECJ at the moment of exit the individual and corporate 
taxpayers have different choices. In the case of individuals Member States 
cannot levy immediate exit taxes, an automatic deferral till realization of the 
asset must be provided.150 On the other hand, corporate taxpayers have the 
choice between immediate taxation, deferral till realization and the payment 
of the tax in installments over a period of time depending on the national 
legislation of Member States and the type of assets.151 Hence, these options 
that the taxpayers have, must be analyzed. 
The distributive rule from article 13(5) establishes the right to tax to the 
state in which the alienator is a resident. It follows that the residency of the 
taxpayers must be determined. Article 1 states that the Convention applies 
to the residents of one or both state, theoretically, there is not a moment 
when the taxpayer is not a resident of either of the Contracting States.152 
Based on the definition of exit taxation and practical cases, it can be 
concluded that the deemed alienation is established to be right before the 
moment the taxpayer changes residency.153 Thus, the right to tax is 
accordingly within the ambit powers of the emigration state.  
Despite the fact that immediate exit taxes are practically forbidden in the 
EU, they still can be applied at the request of corporate taxpayers.154 
Therefore in such a situation, following the logic described above, there is 
nothing to forbid a Member State in levying them, article 13(5) allocates 
this right to the state of emigration. Hence, the OECD Model Convention 
does not prohibit immediate exit taxes.  
In the case of deferred exit taxes the situation is a bit more complicated. 
The asset is effectively disposed when the taxpayer is a resident of the 
immigration state, therefore according to article 13(5) that state has the right 
to tax it. As a consequence, according to some scholars, the only way the 
emigration state could levy the exit tax is to modify the provisions of article 
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13(5).155 One country that does this is Sweden, it reserves its right to tax the 
gains if the assets are sold in a period of ten years after the migration.156  
However, in the opinion of the author, the tax liability for deferred exit taxes 
is set in the form of a preserving assessment when the taxpayer is still a 
resident of the emigration state based on the principle of territoriality. As a 
result, the fact that the payment of the tax is deferred until realization is just 
a financial benefit for the taxpayer imposed by EU law, it is merely a debt 
that is due at the moment of realization of the asset. These circumstances do 
not change the right of the state of emigration to levy the tax. The tax 
liability corresponds to the value increases registered when the taxpayer was 
a resident in the state of exit.157 The only element that changes in this 
situation, is that the state of immigration has also the right to tax the asset in 
question. Respectively, even in the case of deferred exit taxes, the state of 
emigration can still levy the tax. The same line of reasoning also applies in 
the case of levying the exit tax in installments spread over a period of time 
when the taxpayer is a resident of the state of immigration.   
4.4 Double Taxation 
The sole problem that remains unsolved in the case of exit taxes is double 
taxation. If the emigration state levies the exit tax on unrealized gains before 
the exit (immediate exit taxes), or a preserving assessment in the case of 
deferred exit taxes, when the asset will be effectively sold in the 
immigration state, it will be taxed again.158 Both states apply the tax when 
the taxpayer is their resident, therefore the exemption or credit method 
enshrined in Article 23 A and B cannot solve the double taxation.159 
One way this issue could be settled if the state of immigration would 
provide a step-up in value of the assets for the immigrating taxpayer.160 
Basically, this would mean that the tax base for state of immigration would 
be the market value at moment the taxpayer became a resident, therefore the 
increase in value registered in the state of emigration would not be taxed 
twice.161 In consequence, when the taxpayer will sell the asset in the state of 
immigration at a price higher than the original market value, only 
subsequent increases in value will be taxed.162 Such a solution can be 
introduced by states that apply exit taxes into their bilateral treaties or 
provided unilaterally by the immigration states in order to prevent double 
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taxation.163 Unfortunately, not many countries provide such a solution, it is 
mainly provided for individuals and in special circumstances, for example 
the Netherlands provides a step-up for substantial shareholdings.164 
A second solution is for the state of emigration to provide a reverse credit 
when the state of immigration taxes capital gains upon realization.165 In 
essence this represents a tax credit that is limited to the amount of the 
foreign tax paid by the taxpayer only in regard to the part of the gain that 
was subject to tax in the emigration state.166 This solution can also be 
introduced in the bilateral treaties or provided unilaterally. Likewise the 
step-up solution, few countries counteract double taxation with this 
method.167  
Last but not least, the third solution would be for the state of immigration to 
offer a foreign tax credit.168 This credit could be limited to the part of value 
that was taxed in the state of emigration. This solution is also not very 
common due to the fact that the ‘exit taxes are levied while the taxpayer was 
not a resident of the immigration state, and generally only residents can 
claim a foreign tax credit’.169 
Lamentably, the OECD Model Convention provides none of the described 
solutions for double taxation. Contracting States have to provide these 
solutions unilaterally or introduce them in their bilateral treaties at their own 
initiative. The only existing solution in the Model Convention is Article 
25(3), which encourages Contracting States to resolve by mutual agreement 
the legal issue of double taxation in cases not provided for in the 
Convention. This solution regrettably is not the most expeditious and there 
is no guarantee that the problem will be solved in the interest of the 
taxpayer. 
In summary, it can be stated that exit taxes are not forbidden under the 
OECD Model Convention. In the same time, in the matter of allocating 
taxing rights, the Convention does not provide all the necessary solutions 
for the problems that arise when these taxes are levied.  
5. Conclusions 
Exit taxes represent the expression of a state’s sovereignty by levying taxes 
on value increases that arose on its territory. The tax is applied as a result of 
the intention of the taxpayer to change residency which in consequence 
would remove a state’s power to tax income that was accrued during the 
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period the taxpayer was a resident. In essence exit taxation is about 
territoriality and tax sovereignty. The purpose of the countries that apply 
exit taxes is to protect their tax base and to prevent the escaping of untaxed 
revenues from their jurisdiction.  
The first legal issue that the ECJ dealt with in the case of exit taxation was 
the legal personality of the exiting entity. Albeit the fact that in the current 
state of affairs Member States still have the power to pinpoint the 
connecting factor with its territory and consequently decide the legal status 
of a company, the Court has introduced a loophole that taxpayers can use. 
Under a real seat system, the transfer of a company’s effective management 
would result in its liquidation without any access to the rights guaranteed by 
the TFEU. A company can escape this discrimination by converting itself at 
the moment of exit into a legal form of the host state. Provided that the 
legislation of the immigration state permits so, the end result is the change 
of applicable law and the reincorporation of the company. 
The subsequent cases in individual exit taxation and corporate exit taxation 
proved to have a very different result. Due to the fact that the ECJ offers 
different solutions for these situations it can be practically considered that 
according to the ECJ exit taxes are split into two categories, exit taxes on 
individuals and exit taxes on companies. In essence, it can be ascertained 
that the ECJ contradicts itself by creating different rules for the exit of an 
individual and a company. Long before the exit taxation cases the ECJ has 
held that companies are to be treated in the same way as natural persons 
who are nationals of Member States. Likewise, in the opinion of the author 
this kind of treatment is in contradiction to the provisions of article 54 of the 
TFEU.  
An exit tax system in the case of individuals must only represent a final tax 
assessment with an automatic deferral of the tax itself till the realization of 
the assets in question, also with future consideration to reductions in value. 
On the other hand, in the case of corporate exit taxation Member States do 
not have to take account of any future reductions in value and deferral may 
be conditioned upon the provision of guarantees and the payment of interest.  
Additionally, the ECJ accepts that due to the risk of non-recovery of the tax 
increases with the passing of time, Member States can tax the unrealized 
gains at a different point than the actual realization. A deferral system that 
spreads the exit tax over a period of consecutive years was found to be a 
proportional measure for the attainment of the objective of preserving the 
balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between Member States. 
Another solution provided by the ECJ is for exit taxes that have the purpose 
to recapture previously deducted losses. Member States cannot tax 
absolutely everything when they lose the power to impose taxes over a legal 
entity. Some basic benefits that a company had in one country cannot be 
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reversed after its transfer to a different jurisdiction. The right to deduct 
losses cannot be denied if Member States tax the profits made in respect of 
that establishment before its transfer, including those resulting from the gain 
made upon the transfer.  
The ECJ decisions on exit taxation conclusively support the hypothesis that 
this paper attempts to prove. The Court has held that a Member State is 
entitled to tax the economic value generated by an unrealized capital gain in 
its territory even if the gain concerned has not yet actually been realized. At 
the same time, it is in accordance with the principle of fiscal territoriality, 
connected with a temporal component, namely the fact that the taxable 
person is resident for tax purposes within national territory during the period 
in which the capital gains arise to levy exit taxes. 
Moreover, the ECJ stated that the transfer of the place of effective 
management of a company of one Member State to another cannot mean 
that the state of origin has to abandon its right to tax a capital gain which 
arose within the ambit of its powers of taxation before the transfer. Exit 
taxes are intended to avoid situations capable of jeopardizing the right of the 
Member State of origin to exercise its powers of taxation in relation to 
activities carried on in its territory and may therefore be justified on grounds 
connected with the preservation of the balanced allocation of powers to 
impose taxes between Member States.  
From an international perspective, the right to levy exit taxes can also be 
affected by bilateral tax treaties that are most commonly based on the 
OECD Model Convention. Unfortunately, the utilization of the Convention 
in the case of exit taxes does not prove to be without difficulties.  
Due to the fact that the Commentary on article 13 of the Convention 
provides contradictory statements with regards to the concept of alienation, 
it is not yet settled if the term alienation from article 13(5) includes deemed 
realizations of assets. As a result, this subject is still open for debates and 
interpretation. Moreover, this issue opens up the matter of treaty override. A 
Contracting State by deeming a realization of the assets when the taxpayers 
leave its jurisdiction can be considered to be overriding the applicable 
treaty. However, in the opinion of the author, the Commentary provides for 
sufficient arguments on which Contracting States can rely when they levy 
exit taxes on unrealized gains.  
Last but not least, a problem that remains unsolved is double taxation. The 
OECD Model Convention does not provide any solution for this legal issue 
in the case of exit taxation. The available solutions, such as a step-up 
mechanism or a reverse credit can only be provided unilaterally or 
negotiated at their own initiative by Contracting States.  
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Despite the described difficulties, it can be concluded that the Model 
Convention does not forbid exit taxation. The distribution rule from article 
13(5) establishes the right to tax to the state in which the taxpayer is a 
resident. Based on the fact that the tax liability is established when the 
taxpayer is still a resident, the right to levy the tax remains within the ambit 
power of taxation of the state of emigration.  
In conclusion, notwithstanding that there are a number of difficulties, both 
on the EU and international level there are no explicit obstacles that would 
impede a Member State to levy exit taxes. Even though exit taxes are found 
to be a restriction on the basic freedoms, the ECJ acknowledges the right of 
Member States to defend their tax base through these methods. It also forces 
them to develop exit tax systems that would put as fewer restrictions as 
possible for the access of individuals and companies to the freedoms 
enshrined by the TFEU.  Judging by the development in exit taxation case 
law, it can be expected that the ECJ will further inflict its jurisdiction in 
direct taxation in order to solve the arising legal issues.    
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